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We study the efficacy of horizontal versus vertical social learning processes in a 
public goods game. In one treatment, subjects about to play the game can make non-
binding common knowledge announcements about their intentions while, in another, 
subjects do not communicate directly with group members but receive common 
knowledge advice from the previous generation of players. A third treatment has 
subjects play with neither communication nor advice. We find that groups that engage 
in peer communication achieve much lower levels of contribution to the public good 
than do groups that receive advice.  We attribute this finding in part to the fact that 
some subjects in the communication treatment opted to make no announcement 
during the communication phase of play. 
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1. Introduction 
Early experimental research looking at private provision of public goods using a 
voluntary contributions mechanism under anonymity and non-assortative matching 
established two empirical regularities. First, in one-shot plays of the game, 
contributions usually average 40%-60% of the social optimum with wide variations in 
individual contribution ranging from 0% to 100%. Second, if the game is repeated, 
contributions in round 1 start out in the 40%-60% range but then decline gradually 
over time as more and more subjects choose to “free ride.” This second result 
suggests that cooperation unravels over time and that experimental play of the public 
goods game tends toward the Nash equilibrium of 100% free riding, even though the 
strong free riding hypothesis of zero contribution is seldom borne out. Ledyard (1995) 
describes a generic public goods experiment and provides a comprehensive review of 
the literature.  
  In recent years, a number of researchers have adduced evidence which raises 
questions about the free-riding hypothesis in public goods games. Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr (2001), Kocher (2004), Houser and Kurzban (2005), Burlando and 
Guala (2005), and Keser and van Winden (2000) have documented that a large 
majority of subjects in experimental public goods games are conditional cooperators. 
Conditional cooperators are subjects whose contributions are positively correlated 
with the expected contribution of others and whose behaviour, therefore, is not 
consistent with the free riding hypothesis. These subjects are willing to contribute 
more if they believe that others in the group will contribute more as well.  
  Further research has investigated broader behaviour patterns of the conditional 
cooperators.  Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Gächter, Hermann and Thöni (2003), 
Masclet et al. (2003), and Noussair and Tucker (2005) show that conditional   4
cooperators are often willing to punish non-cooperators even if non-negligible 
monetary costs are incurred in carrying out such punishment and even if it is a pure 
one-shot game with no scope for future interactions or reputation building. Thus, 
conditional cooperation coupled with the opportunity to punish non-cooperators (who 
violate norms of cooperation among players) results in subjects being able to sustain 
high levels of cooperation over time. Yamagishi (1986) also finds that the possibility 
of punishing free-riders leads to substantial increases in the provision of the public 
good. Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002) suggest that such 
“altruistic punishment” may be the primary driving force behind sustaining 
cooperation in a variety of social dilemmas.  
  Beyond the existence of conditional cooperators and the possibility of 
altruistic punishment, other mechanisms have been shown to reduce the extent of free 
riding in experimental public good games. Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977) 
show that cooperation can be enhanced significantly in a one-shot version of a binary-
decision public goods game (where subjects have to choose between cooperating or 
not) if subjects are allowed to engage in communication prior to participating in the 
game. However such communication has to be “relevant,” in that subjects have to be 
afforded a chance to talk about the game itself, rather than “irrelevant” when subjects 
are given a chance only to get acquainted and only to talk about an unrelated topic. 
Results show that rates of defection (free riding) are significantly higher in the no 
communication (73% defection rate) or irrelevant communication conditions (65% 
defection rate) as compared to the relevant communication treatment (26% defection 
rate). Isaac and Walker (1988) also report increased cooperation with communication. 
In one design, subjects start out playing for 10 rounds with no communication and 
then are allowed to communicate prior to each round during rounds 11 through 20.   5
Cooperation levels jump up in the latter rounds and approach 100% at the end of the 
final round. In another design, subjects communicate during the first 10 rounds but 
not during the next 10 rounds. This latter treatment results in very high levels of 
contributions in the first set of 10 rounds and, surprisingly, shows contribution levels 
remaining high even during the latter 10 rounds when no communication could occur.  
All of these results suggest that the strong free-riding hypothesis for public 
goods games is not borne out in experimental play and that a variety of social learning 
processes play an important role in enhancing cooperation in such social dilemmas. 
Given that we are acculturated by both our elders and our peers, such social learning 
typically involves “vertical” transmissions (from elders) in addition to the more 
familiar “horizontal” transmissions such as the communication with peers studied in 
the literature described above.
1 Recent work by Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra 
(2005) studies “vertical” social learning using an inter-generational framework in 
which subjects in generation t can leave free-form advice for their generation t+1 
successors. Their work finds that allowing subjects to leave advice in an inter-
generational framework can lead to high contributions to the public good but only 
when such advice is public and common knowledge, that is, when all advice from the 
previous generation is read aloud to subjects by the experimenter.   
Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2004) identify an additional component of 
the advice mechanism that influences cooperation in their public goods game. That 
component is the creation of optimistic beliefs about the cooperation of others that 
follows the reading of advice to subjects. Data on beliefs about what other group 
members would contribute during the first round of play was collected before and 
after the reading of advice. Subjects became convinced that their group members 
                                                 
1 See Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Richerson and Boyd (2005) for more on methods of social 
learning.   6
would contribute more to the public good after hearing the advice read aloud than 
they had believed prior to hearing that advice. 
To our knowledge, no study has been done to compare the efficacy of the 
vertical and horizontal social transmission mechanisms, nor the extent to which these 
mechanisms influence player beliefs about others’ behaviour. Evidence regarding 
which type of transmission is more valuable in achieving and sustaining cooperation 
would be of significant import to our understanding of social dilemmas and how they 
are, or can be, solved. Such evidence would also be significant to the more popular 
(parental) nurture versus (peer) nurture debate in which, for example, Harris (1999) 
has argued that peers are vastly more important in social acculturation than are elders. 
In the current study, we build on the Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2005) 
results by directly addressing the question of which social transmission mechanism, 
vertical or horizontal, leads to greater cooperation in a public goods game. We use 
some of the data from that paper
2 and collect additional data on play of the public 
goods game with common knowledge announcements by players. We explicitly 
consider both the presence of conditional cooperators and the impact of the social 
transmission mechanisms on players’ beliefs about group behaviour. Specifically, we 
look at the behaviour of several types of groups: (1) groups in which members 
communicate with one another in advance of playing the game; (2) groups in which 
members receive advice from a previous generation; and (3) groups in which 
members neither communicate nor receive advice.
3 To be more specific, we have four 
separate treatments in all. The “communication” treatment involves common 
                                                 
2 This data is part of the supplementary material that accompanies Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra 
(2005) and is available publicly from http://www.restud.com/accepted.htm. 
3 Of course social learning will almost always involve a combination of communication and advice. 
Our experimental design aims to reduce the confounding effects of studying both effects 
simultaneously and considers them separately instead. 
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knowledge announcements of intentions by players about to participate in the game. 
The “inter-generational advice” treatment entails free-form advice left by players in 
generation  t and read aloud to players in generation t+1. The “constant advice” 
treatment relies on the reading aloud of the same advice to a number of groups; this 
treatment is included to allow us to hold the quality of advice unchanged for several 
groups.
4 Behaviour in these communication and advice treatments is compared to a 
“no advice” treatment in which a control group of subjects plays the public goods 
game with no opportunities for communicating or receiving advice. This last group 
serves as a benchmark against which we can compare the behaviour of the advice and 
communication groups.  
We find that the contributions to the public good in the communication 
treatment are significantly lower than those achieved by the other groups.  The 
subjects in the communication treatment achieve statistically significantly lower 
levels of cooperation than do subjects in the inter-generational advice, constant 
advice, and even the no advice treatments. Further, within the communication 
treatment we find the presence of heterogeneous types of subjects who behave quite 
differently.  
  In Section 2 we outline the design of our public good experiments. Then in 
Section 3 we present an overview and analysis of behaviour in our “communication” 
treatment. We move to a comparison of this horizontal transmission mechanism to the 
vertical “advice” mechanism in Section 4 and analyze the effects of communication 
on player beliefs in Section 5.  Our final section provides a discussion of the 
                                                 
4 In the “inter-generational advice” treatment, the quality of the advice changes and tends to become 
more exhortative regarding cooperation over time. We include the “constant advice” treatment to test 
whether any increased cooperation in the advice treatments results from the simple reading of the 
advice or from the change in the quality of the advice across generations. Note that there is no temporal 
sequence in the “constant advice” treatment.  
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implications of our results for the free-riding hypothesis and for the solution of social 
dilemmas. 
2. Experimental  Design 
All of the experiments in this paper were implemented as non-computerized pen-and-
paper sessions. All of them were run at Wellesley College in Wellesley, 
Massachusetts using female undergraduate students.
5 We first describe the general 
structure of the public goods game in which all subjects participated and then explain 
the four different treatments that we implemented. 
The public goods game was played using groups of five subjects who played 
the game for 10 rounds. In each round, each subject had an endowment of 10 tokens. 
At the beginning of each round (t), each participant (i) had to simultaneously decide 
on how many of the 10 tokens (in integers) she wanted to contribute to a public 
account and how many tokens she wanted to keep in a private account. Total tokens 
contributed to the public account were doubled by the experimenter and then divided 
equally among all five participants. Total contributions to the public account, the 
doubled amount and the returns to each participant from the public account were 
announced at the end of each round. Each participant’s personal earning for each 
round was the sum of the tokens she decided to keep in her private account and the 
tokens she got back from the public account. Each successive round proceeded in the 
same manner with each subject starting each round with an initial endowment of 10 
tokens.  
In every treatment, tokens were worth US $0.05. The payoff for each subject i 
in any round t was then  
                                                 
5 Wellesley is one of the few remaining all women liberal arts colleges in the US and hence the gender 
bias in the subject pool.    9
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  For our first treatment, the communication treatment, we have 10 groups of 
five subjects each for a total of 50 subjects. Here, prior to the beginning of the actual 
public goods game, subjects are given the opportunity to communicate their 
intentions. They can choose whether to make one of two specific types of 
announcements or to stay silent. Announcements can be of the form “I wish to 
contribute ___ tokens to the public account in round 1” or “Everyone should 
contribute ___ tokens to the public account in round 1” with the subject filling in the 
blank space with a number between 0 and 10. All announcements are made in writing 
by the subjects, collected by the experimenter, and then read out loud to the entire 
group prior to the beginning of the actual experiment. In this way, the anonymity of 
the subjects making each announcement is preserved.  
We also collect data on the beliefs held by subjects regarding the (future) play 
of the group in the communication treatment.  In each session, immediately after the 
instructions are read aloud, we ask each subject what she thinks each member of the 
group (including her) will contribute to the public account in round 1. After each 
subject finishes making this prediction, we proceed to the communication phase. 
Immediately following the communication phase, we once more ask each subject her   10
beliefs about contributions to the public account in round 1. Only after this second set 
of beliefs data is collected do subjects start playing the public goods game itself. 
Subjects get paid for both predictions depending on their accuracy, using a quadratic 
scoring rule.
6 This payment is separate from what is earned from playing the game 
and is a small fraction of what can be earned in the game itself.  
In our inter-generational advice treatment we start by running a “progenitor” 
experiment in which five first-generation subjects play the public goods game with no 
advice. This group leaves advice that is given to the second generation, whose advice 
is passed on to the third generation, etc.
7 All advice is given to each member of a 
generation in writing and also read aloud by the experimenter so that we have 
common knowledge of advice in each generation.  
In this particular case we have data for three distinct “families.” Family 1 
starts with a progenitor group and is followed by four generations. Here, including the 
progenitor we have five groups of five subjects for a total of 25 subjects. Family 2 
starts with a different progenitor group that is followed by six generations for a total 
of seven groups and 35 subjects. Finally, family 3 starts with a new progenitor 
generation followed by five additional generations for a total of 30 subjects. Each 
family represents one independent observation and a distinct time series of data. 
Payoff to a subject in this treatment is the sum of the amounts that she earns during 
her lifetime plus 50% of what her successor earns in the next generation; thus we have 
partial inter-generational caring.
8 Subjects are paid their actual earnings from a 
                                                 
6 See the instructions for the experiment in Appendix A for the scoring rule used. 
7 Note that data generated by multiple generations is not made up of independent observations but 
constitutes one time series. To allow time for behaviour to evolve, we must run our experiments for 
several generations. This process tends to be both time- and money-intensive and we face a trade-off 
between running more generations versus running more replications. 
 
8 The data for families 1 and 2 of the inter-generational advice treatment is taken from the Chaudhuri, 
Graziano and Maitra (2005) study. This data includes contribution levels for all subjects in all groups in   11
session immediately upon completion of the session. The second payment, which acts 
as an incentive for subjects to leave meaningful advice, is distributed at a later date 
after all sessions are complete.  
  Our third treatment is the constant advice treatment in which we have five 
groups with five subjects in each for a total of 25 subjects. Each subject in each group 
here receives a sheet of paper with the exact same advice written on it; this advice is 
also read aloud by the experimenter.
9 In comparison to the inter-generational 
treatment, we have no temporal sequence to the groups here and we keep the quality 
of the advice constant. There is also no second payment in the constant advice 
treatment so the incentive structure and the payoff scheme here is identical to that in 
the communication treatment.  
Finally, in the no advice treatment subjects play the public goods game 
without any opportunity to communicate with fellow group members or receive 
advice. We have five groups in this treatment, each with five subjects, for a total of 25 
subjects. This data comes from the Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2005) study as 
well. In our econometric analysis below we also include the three progenitor groups 
(that did not receive advice) from Families 1, 2 and 3 of the inter-generational advice 
treatment among the no advice groups. This gives us data for eight no advice groups 
for a total of 40 subjects in this treatment. See Table 1 for an overview of the design 
of the experiments and the various treatments implemented.  
                                                                                                                                            
all rounds as well as information on beliefs before and after the receipt of advice; the belief data was 
examined extensively in the earlier study. Note that the experimental design for family 3 differed 
slightly from the other two. Each subject in family 3, but none in families 1 or 2, played five practice 
rounds prior to playing 10 rounds for money. Each subject in family 3 also received a second payment 
which was 20% of what her successor received rather than the 50% received by those in families 1 and 
2. We do not find any significant differences in the contribution levels in family 3 as compared to 
families 1 and 2, so we have chosen to include this family in order to gain data from an additional 
independent replication.  
 
9 Appendix B includes a copy of the advice used in this treatment. 
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<<Table 1 about here>>
3.  Results for the communication treatment 
We start with some descriptive statistics relating to the behaviour of three distinct sets 
of subjects within the communication treatment. Recall that subjects here are given 
the choice of remaining silent or making one of two announcements, either “I will 
contribute ___ tokens in round 1” or “Everyone should contribute ___ tokens in round 
1.” We assign each subject a “communication code” (CC) determined by her choice. 
Subjects who choose silence are assigned the code CC0. Those who choose to make a 
statement of the “I will contribute…” type are assigned CC1 while those who choose 
to say “Everyone should contribute…” are coded as CC2. There are seven subjects in 
the CC0 category, 13 in CC1 and 30 in CC2.  
  Figure 1 illustrates the average contribution for each communication code 
group in each round. Not surprisingly, we see that average contributions for each 
group fall over time.  Average contributions are the lowest in every round for CC0, 
the subjects who choose silence, and interestingly, average contributions are highest 
in every round for the CC1 subjects (those who make an “I will contribute…” 
statement). 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
The data indicate that average contributions for the group as a whole start at 
57.2% in round 1 (approximately six out of ten tokens) and decay over time to 18.4% 
in round 10 (slightly less than two out of ten tokens). Each communication group 
shows a similar pattern, although the levels differ for each group. Average 
contributions start at 70% for CC1 subjects compared to around 59% for subjects in 
CC2 and only 24% for those in CC0. Average contributions actually drop to 0% by 
the last period for the CC0 group.    13
Using a standard t-test (t = 1.99, p-value = 0.0619), we find that average 
contributions are statistically significantly lower for those subjects who remain silent 
(CC0) compared to those who make an announcement of some type (CC1 and CC2). 
However, if we consider only those subjects who choose to make an announcement 
(CC1 and CC2), we find that average contributions are not significantly different 
across the two treatments (t = 0.5251, p-value = 0.6077). The results are the same 
using a rank sum test. Contributions are statistically significantly lower for the CC0 
subjects compared to the CC1 and CC2 subjects (z = 1.939, p-value = 0.0526) and if 
we restrict ourselves to the CC1 and CC2 subjects we find that contributions are not 
significantly different across the two treatments (z = 0.583, p-value = 0.5602). 
The descriptive statistics presented in Figure 1 give us a broad overview of 
subject behaviour, but it is worthwhile to carry out some econometric analysis of 
individual level contributions across the three communication types as well. Such an 
analysis provides insight into the temporal pattern of contributions.  
Let  it C  be the contribution of player i in period t. This observed contribution 
it C  equals the desired contribution, 
*
it C  (which is a latent variable), if and only if 
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invariant effects (like treatment effects), time varying variables (like an individual’s   14
earnings in the previous round), and an overall time effect, which is common to all 
players.  Each subject’s contribution is bounded by zero from below and by ten (the 
token endowment) from above and thus we estimate this model as a random effects 
Tobit.
10 
We include four explanatory variables. There are two communication category 
dummies, one each for CC1 and CC2 with CC0 serving as the reference category. 
There is the inverse of time () 1
t  which allows us to capture the non-linearity in the 
effect of time on contributions and also allows us to distinguish between the effects of 
early and later rounds on contributions. Also included is the deviation from the 











Ψ= − ∑ , where n is the size of the group. This last variable is 
included to test whether players, in deciding on their contribution levels in period t, 
take into account how their individual contributions compared to the group average in 
period t-1. Note that  1 0 it− Ψ>  implies that player i contributed less than the group 
average in period  1 t −  while  1 0 it− Ψ≤  implies that player i contributed at least the 
group average or more in period  1 t − .  
Table 2 presents the regression results for individual contributions by player i 
in period t for each of the three different models. The Random Effects Tobit 
regressions are presented in column (2). We note, first, that individual contributions 
                                                 
10 For the sake of comparison we also compute the random effects GLS regression, although this 
method does not account for the upper and lower censoring of the dependent variable and the estimates 
are inconsistent. We cannot compute the corresponding fixed effects Tobit model because there does 
not exist a sufficient statistic that allows the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood 
function. We do check the robustness of our results by obtaining the unconditional Tobit estimates with 
player fixed effects, conceding that these latter estimates are biased.   15
are negatively and significantly affected by time. Contributions fall as t increases and 
as 1
t decreases, hence the positive coefficient associated with  1
t .  
Second, both of the communication category dummies (CC1 and CC2) are 
positive and statistically significant. This result implies that those who choose to 
communicate contribute more to the pool. However, using a  ( )
2 1 χ  test, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the two communication categories (CC1 and CC2) have 
the same effect. This result suggests that the contributions of CC2 subjects are not 
statistically significantly less than those of CC1 subjects.  
Third, the deviation from the group average in period  1 t −   ( ) ,1 it − Ψ  does not 
have a statistically significant effect on contributions in period t. As a result, we must 
conclude that our hypothesis that there is a dynamic component to individual 
contributions  is not borne out in the data. 
The Random Effects GLS regression results and the Tobit regression results 
with player fixed effects are presented in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2. The results 
from these models are qualitatively very similar to the Random Effects Tobit 
regression results presented in column (2). We find positive and significant time 
variables and communication category dummies in both models and the 
2 χ  test in our 
unconditional Tobit with player fixed effects shows that the player dummies are 
jointly statistically significant at the 1% level.  
<<Table 2 about here>> 
  It is clear from our discussion above that the CC0 subjects are especially 
uncooperative. In fact, when examining the behaviour of each actual playing group in 
this treatment, we find that groups with more CC0 subjects are less cooperative than 
groups with fewer CC0 subjects. Furthermore, we find that the presence of CC0   16
subjects reduces the level of cooperation of the CC1 and CC2 types as well; these 
other subjects contribute significantly less to the public good with an increase in the 
number of CC0 types in the group. In Figure 2 we focus exclusively on the behaviour 
of CC1 and CC2 subjects, dividing them into four sub-groups as follows: (1) when 
there are no CC0 types in the group; (2) where there is only 1 CC0 type in the group; 
(3) when there are 2 CC0 types in the group and finally (4) when there are 3 CC0 
types in the group. There are no groups with more than three CC0 types in the group. 
The figure presents the average contribution by the CC1 and CC2 types in each round 
when the sample is subdivided using the number of CC0 types in each group. It is 
clear from Figure 2 that the CC1 and CC2 subjects are far less cooperative when there 
are more CC0 types in the group. In fact there is a dramatic reduction in contributions 
of the CC1 and CC2 types when the number of CC0 types in the group increases from 
0 to 1. Contribution levels are not as low when there are 2 CC0 types in the group as 
opposed to 1 or 3 CC0 types, but given the small number of observations we are 
working with, it is not surprising that we do not find a clearly delineated pattern of 
behaviour. What is striking is that the presence of CC0 subjects does seem to have a 
dampening effect on the contributions of the CC1 and CC2 types. We return to this 
issue in Section 6 where we discuss the implications of our results.  
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
4.  Comparing vertical and horizontal transmission 
In this section we compare behaviour in the communication treatment with that in the 
two (inter-generational and constant) advice treatments and in the no  advice 
treatment. As described above, subjects in the communication treatment are limited to 
a set of two specific announcements or silence while subjects in the inter-generational   17
advice treatment can leave free-form advice for later players.  Most of the advice left 
in this treatment specified some kind of a dynamic rule, but in two out of the three 
families, and especially in the later generations, the advice left was very strong with 
literally every subject exhorting her successors to contribute all ten tokens to the 
public account “…all the time!” We control for the quality of advice in the constant 
advice treatment by providing the same set of advice, chosen for its representative 
nature, to each of the five groups.  Subjects in the no advice treatment received 
neither communications nor advice from other members of their group (or previous 
groups). 
  Figure 3 illustrates average contributions aggregated over all groups, or 
generations, for each of our four treatments over the 10 rounds of play. Contributions 
in both advice treatments are higher in every round than those in the communication 
or no advice treatments; contributions are actually highest in the constant advice 
treatment. For those subjects playing with constant advice, average contributions start 
near 85% in round 1, and in the inter-generational advice treatment average 
contributions start at about 73%.  In contrast, in the communication and no advice 
treatments, average contributions start at only about 57% and 59%, respectively. By 
round 10, average contributions in all treatments have fallen considerably but those in 
the constant  and  inter-generational advice treatments are at 51% and 42%, 
respectively. These ending levels are not far below the starting levels in the other two 
treatments. Those treatments end even lower, with average contributions in the no 
advice treatment falling to 37% and average contributions in the communication 
treatment falling considerably lower to 18% in round 10. Overall, we also see in 
Figure 3 that average contributions in the communication treatment decay appreciably 
faster over the 10 rounds than do contributions in any of the other three treatments.   18
Finally it is worth noting that a Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
samples (for the different treatments) are drawn from the same population (p-value = 
0.0270).   
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
In addition to analysing the descriptive statistics associated with each the four 
treatment groups, we provide some additional parametric evidence that the 
communication groups attain lower levels of contribution to the public good than do 
the advice, and even the no advice, groups. We regress contributions against a set of 
dependent variables identical to those employed in Section 3, except for the category 
dummies.  Here we include three treatment dummies, one for the no advice treatment, 
one for the inter-generational advice treatment and the third for the constant advice 
treatment. We use the communication treatment as the reference category. As in 
Section 3, we test our data with three separate models, a random effects Tobit model, 
a random effects GLS model and also a Tobit model with player fixed effects.  
The results for our three regressions are presented in columns 2 through 4 of 
Table 3. Not surprisingly, these results are similar in all three models. Relative to the 
reference category of the communication treatment, Table 3 indicates that 
contributions are statistically significantly higher in all three of the other treatments, 
with the constant advice treatment highest and the no advice treatment lowest of the 
three. The null hypotheses of overall and pair wise equality of treatment effects are 
always rejected. Unlike in our regressions for the communication treatment alone, we 
find evidence of dynamics in individual behaviour in this model; the coefficient 
estimate for  ,1 it − Ψ  is negative and statistically significant. This result implies that 
subjects in the different treatments do take into account how their contributions in the 
previous round deviated from the group average and whether they were above or   19
below that average. Finally the time variable ( ) 1
t  is significant at the 1% level in all 
three models.   
<<Table 3 about here>> 
Our results imply that the groups in which there is direct communication 
among fellow group members are significantly less cooperative (achieve significantly 
lower average contributions to the public good) than their peers who engage in 
vertical social learning via advice from predecessors. Most studies to date have 
suggested that direct communication is generally beneficial to players. Thus our data 
appears surprising in light of this literature on the positive impact of player 
communication, even cheap talk, on both coordination and cooperation in 
experimental games.
11  
Perhaps the observed low levels of contributions in our communication 
treatment are not surprising after all. Bear in mind that a non-negligible number of 
subjects (seven out of 50, or 14%) chose to remain silent in this treatment. Such 
silence is very possibly (and ex post correctly) perceived by other group members as a 
signal of non-cooperation and might have contributed to the generally low levels of 
contributions in the communication treatment.  
Interestingly, there is one earlier paper that is more in keeping with the results 
we obtain. Orbell, Dawes and van de Kragt (1990) study the role of communication in 
a different version of the public goods game in which subjects are free to make non-
binding promises to others about their contributions. They find that such non-binding 
promises can lead to significantly higher levels of cooperation but only when all 
members of a particular group promise to contribute.  There is no evidence that 
                                                 
11 See Cooper, et. al. (1989, 1992) for evidence on the effect of player communication in coordination 
and battle-of-the-sexes games and Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977) as well as Isaac and Walker 
(1988) for evidence in public goods games.    20
promises enhance cooperation when such promise-making is less than universal. We 
may be observing another example of the same type of phenomenon in which 
cooperation is enhanced only when an entire group signals cooperative intent. In our 
case, we can go even further and claim that perhaps only one particular type of 
announcement (“promise”), when made universally, can improve cooperation in the 
game. 
The obvious heterogeneity among the subjects in our communication 
treatment leaves us with lingering questions regarding their differential performance 
relative to the subjects in the three other treatment groups.  To address these issues, 
we perform a simulation designed to ensure that the small number of subjects in each 
communication code group does not mask larger tendencies in the population. We 
consider what would happen if we could separate the three communication code 
groups (CC0, CC1, and CC2) into three distinct groups. What behaviour could we 
expect to see in these three separate populations, each consisting of subjects of all one 
type? 
We know that behaviour in the public goods game is extremely path 
dependent, with contributions typically falling off over time. Thus, what happens in 
the first round of a ten round interaction is crucial. If a group of subjects is going to 
succeed in achieving high levels of contributions to the public good, then they must 
start at a reasonably high level. Within our simulation, we focus on this specific issue, 
looking at first-round behaviour of all possible five-member groups that can be 
formed for each of our three sub-populations. Given that we have seven subjects in 
the CC0 group, 13 in CC1 and 30 in CC2, we have 
! 5 ! 2
! 7
 = 21 possible groups among 
the CC0-types, 
! 5 ! 8
! 13
= 1287 possible groups among the CC1-types and finally 
! 5 ! 25
! 30
 =   21
142,506 possible groups among the CC2-types. We determine the average first-round 
contribution for each possible group in each sub-population and then compare the 
averages across communication code groups. 
In Figure 4, we present the results of our simulation exercise. Each histogram 
in Figure 4 is associated with a particular communication code group and shows the 
percentage of our simulated groups (within the given CC population) yielding a 
particular average first-round contribution. Among the sub-population that chooses 
silence (CC0), illustrated in the top panel of Figure 4, we find that almost 30% of the 
simulated groups have average first-round contributions of 0 and almost 85% of them 
have average first-round contributions at or below 40% (4 out of 10 tokens). With 
these low levels of cooperation in the very first round, the vast majority of the 
simulated CC0 groups would end up achieving very low levels of contribution to the 
public good overall.  
At the other extreme, the middle panel of Figure 4 shows that almost 90% of 
the simulated CC1 groups would contribute 50% or more on average in round 1, with 
almost a third of the groups starting their 10 round interaction with an average first-
round contribution above 90%. Such high initial contribution levels should mean that 
a sub-population of CC1-types could keep contributions quite high over the 10 
rounds.  
The data for the CC2 group presented in the bottom panel of Figure 4 is more 
diffused. These groups would clearly end up being more cooperative than the CC0-
types but probably less cooperative than the CC1-types.  A substantial number of 
potential CC2 groups would start at relatively low levels of contributions in the first 
round. About 50% of the simulated groups would have an average round 1   22
contribution of 60% or more. However, in almost 35% of these groups the average 
round 1 contribution would be 40% or less.  
<<Figure 4 about here>> 
There is too much interdependence among the observations in the simulation 
exercise to carry out any formal statistical tests. We also do not try to simulate play 
for 10 full rounds; it is not clear whether that exercise would convey much 
meaningful information given that subjects do learn from each others’ choices over 
rounds. Based on the limited simulation results presented above, however, we can 
conjecture that even the communication treatment would witness high levels of 
contribution if the majority of announcements were of the CC1, “I will contribute…,” 
type. Thus our evidence is indeed consistent with Orbell, Dawes, and van de Kragt 
(1990) but only for one of our communication code groups. 
5.  Beliefs in the communication treatment 
Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2004) report that one way in which common 
knowledge of advice influences contributions to the public good is via the creation of 
optimistic beliefs about the cooperation of others. They find that with common 
knowledge of advice, subjects become convinced that their group members will 
contribute more to the public good after hearing the advice read aloud than they had 
believed prior to hearing that advice.  
  As explained in Section 2, subjects in our communication treatment were 
asked about their beliefs regarding their fellow group members’ contributions to the 
public good. Specifically each subject was asked to indicate how many subjects she 
believed would choose to contribute 0 or 1 or 2 or …10 tokens to the public good in 
round 1. This was done once before the communication round and once after each 
subject had been given the opportunity to make an announcement about her intentions   23
and had heard the entire groups’ announcements read aloud. (See the instructions in 
Appendix A for the belief elicitation mechanism and the scoring rule used.) This 
prediction about the contributions of fellow group members is payoff relevant since 
subjects are paid according to the accuracy of their predictions using a quadratic 
scoring rule. Their responses to the belief question give us insight about what they 
expect other members of the group to contribute to the public account in round 1 of 
their 10 round interaction. Each subject makes this prediction for everyone in the 
group including her.  
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is now evidence that a large 
majority of subjects in experimental public goods games are conditional cooperators. 
Such players make contributions that are positively correlated with the expected 
contribution of others. We can categorize our subjects into different groups depending 
on how their beliefs about contributions to the public good in round 1 are related to 
their actual contributions in that round. We define a subject as a conditional 
cooperator if that subject’s contribution to the public account in round 1 falls within 
one token more or less than her stated beliefs about average group contributions in 
round 1. (See Burlando and Guala (2005) and Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2005) 
for a similar metric) For example, if a subject expects the average contribution to the 
public account to be x tokens in round 1, then we classify this subject as a conditional 
cooperator if she contributes x-1, x or x+1 tokens in round 1. Any subject who 
contributes more than the expected average contribution plus one token (i.e. x+2 
tokens or more) is a cooperator and anyone who contributes less than the expected 
average minus one token (i.e. x-2 tokens or less) is a non-cooperator.  
Using this method of classifying subjects we find that among the CC0 types, 
57% are non-cooperators while the remaining 43% are conditional cooperators and   24
there are no cooperators. Among the CC1 types the majority (54%) are conditional 
cooperators while the remaining 46% are divided equally into non-cooperators and 
cooperators. The CC2 group (which consists of 30 out of 50 subjects in this treatment) 
is interesting. Here 50% of the subjects are conditional cooperators, 33% are non-
cooperators and 17% are cooperators.  This might explain why the round 1 
contributions of this sub-population are so diffuse in the simulation exercise presented 
in Figure 4.  
In order to look more closely at the beliefs held by subjects in the 
communication treatment, we take recourse once again to a simulation exercise 
similar to the one described in Section 4. Instead of looking only at the actual data on 
beliefs as stated by the subjects we create a hypothetical data set of beliefs. This 
hypothetical belief data set consists of beliefs expressed both before and after the 
common knowledge announcements made during the communication round. We 
could simply look at the actual beliefs expressed by the subjects but as argued before 
if we did so then the small number of observations might easily mask population wide 
tendencies. Thus, as before, we divide up the subjects into the three communication 
categories – CC0, CC1 and CC2 – and then form all possible five member groups 
among those sub-populations. Then we look at the beliefs expressed by each of those 
possible five-member groups and aggregate over all groups to come up with the data 
contained in Table 4. The belief data contained in Table 4 then provides us with an 
overview of the beliefs that these three sub-populations might possess about their 
fellow group members. We use this hypothetical data on beliefs as a benchmark of the 
beliefs held by the different groups.   
We find that the CC0 subjects have very pessimistic initial beliefs, expecting 
only 28% (2.83 tokens) contribution to the public good on average in round 1. The   25
communication round does make these subjects more optimistic but not much more 
so. After the communication rounds, CC0 types believe that average contributions to 
the public good will be 37% in round 1. The beliefs of the CC1 and CC2 subjects 
prior to the communication round are roughly similar; each group expects average 
contributions of around 50-55% in round 1. After the communication round the CC1 
players experience the greatest increase in optimism in that they now expect average 
contributions of around 73% as opposed to 51% before. This result is somewhat 
surprising because in some cases the communication round would include subjects 
choosing to stay silent and would have confirmed the presence of subjects who chose 
an announcement other than the CC1 type (and, in retrospect, only an announcement 
of the CC1 type is an indication of strong cooperation). We would have expected this 
to lead to greater pessimism rather than to increased optimism. For the CC2 subjects, 
there is also slightly greater optimism following the communication round. These 
subjects believe post-communication that contributions in round 1 will average 63%, 
versus a belief of 55% before.  
What is interesting is that prior studies find that, under anonymity, non-
assortative matching, and in the absence of explicit communication between group 
members, or punishments or rewards, contributions usually start around 60% and 
decline steadily from then onwards. Thus for the majority of subjects in the 
communication treatment (37 subjects out of 50 or 74% in the two categories CC0 
and CC2 combined) their beliefs are not any more optimistic than one would have 
expected to see in most prior studies. The common knowledge announcements of 
intentions did not succeed in elevating the beliefs of the majority of our subjects 
beyond the historical 60% benchmark. Again bear in mind that we are not talking   26
about the actual beliefs held by members of groups that actually formed but about 
beliefs that could have been held by all possible five-member groups.  
From rows 3 through 5 of Table 4 we find that first round contributions in the 
communication treatment are indeed strongly correlated with the actual post-
communication beliefs held prior to that first round. Given that those beliefs are not 
terribly optimistic it is not surprising that contributions in this treatment started out at 
about 57% which is well within the benchmark established in prior studies.  
<<Table 4 about here>>   
6.  Discussion of our results and concluding remarks 
The most striking finding in our study is the relative lack of success of the 
communication groups, those with horizontal information transmission, vis-à-vis the 
advice groups, in which information moved vertically. Importantly, we cannot 
attribute this difference in behaviour to differences in payment schemes. Although 
each inter-generational advice subject receives a second payment, equal to 50% her 
successor’s earnings, subjects in the constant advice and communication treatments 
each receive only one payment. If the payment scheme is driving the result, then we 
should observe little difference between the constant advice and communication 
treatments. But we get very strong differences there as well.  
Nor can the differences in contribution levels between the communication and 
advice groups be attributed to the fact that the communication in our experiment is a 
one-time announcement prior to the start of the public goods game itself. Our method 
of communication is certainly a factor behind the low contributions; other papers that 
find that communication enhances efficiency, such as Isaac and Walker (1988) or 
Cooper et al., (1989, 1992), all have subjects engaging in multiple rounds of   27
communication. But, in our set-up, advice is also read out loud only once prior to 
starting the game. If any cooperation-enhancing effect of the one-round, pre-play 
communication is short-lived, we would not expect a single, pre-play round of advice 
to fare any better. Thus we are left with the conclusion that the presence of advice 
seems to have a salutary effect on contributions which the availability of 
communication does not. The finding that advice makes a difference is not surprising. 
Schotter (2003) provides an overview of a series of experiments where subjects can 
receive advice and where this advice has a salutary impact on decision making. The 
puzzle here is why announcements made at the beginning of the game by the 
participants themselves have such little impact on contributions to the public good.  
  Rabin (1993) shows that in the presence of reciprocal preferences it is possible 
to think of the public goods game as a coordination problem with multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria. The problem of sustaining high contributions in the public goods 
game is then primarily a problem of equilibrium selection. Cooper et al. (1992) shows 
that two-way communication facilitates coordination to the payoff dominant outcome 
in a simpler coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria.  Cooper et al. 
(1992, p. 750) comment, “The role of communication then is to provide a basis for the 
strong beliefs needed to overcome coordination failure.” This insight might explain 
why our communication treatment does not perform well. It is possible that 
sufficiently optimistic beliefs can be created only if announcements possess some 
degree of unanimity; Orbell, Dawes and van de Kragt (1990) make this point in their 
work. Also, as Farrell and Rabin (1996) have observed, the availability of 
communication creates a meta-coordination game where players must coordinate their 
beliefs on what various messages mean before they can coordinate on what actions to 
choose. It is conceivable that all non-announcements are perceived as signals of   28
subsequent non-cooperative behaviour. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
observed behavior illustrated in Figure 2, above, with subjects contributing less when 
there are more “silent” players in their group. Moreover it is possible that all 
announcements of the type “Everyone should…” also created a degree of ambiguity 
regarding future behaviour; ex post, we do find that a substantial number of subjects 
who chose an announcement of this type ended up behaving as free-riders.  
Another possible explanation for the poor performance of the communication 
treatment is that there is a greater sense of disillusionment in that treatment. Subjects 
hear statements made by others about what each will do or what each thinks the group 
should do. Then the subjects play the first round of the game and observe that the 
outcomes are not commensurate with the announcements. This discovery may lead to 
a greater sense of “betrayal” and subsequent loss of trust in the communication 
treatment. There is no similar issue of trust in the advice treatments because there is 
no direct communication among subjects in those treatments.  In the communication 
groups, subjects "know" more about each other, via the communication, than in any of 
the other treatments. For this reason, they may be more sensitive to low contributions. 
To the extent that the previous literature is correct in declaring public goods 
games to be ones primarily of coordination, our results suggest that communication is 
not as efficient in achieving coordination as is the passing of advice. Of course, any 
pre-play announcement, whether direct communication or advice, is essentially a 
correlating device in the sense of Aumann (1974). Thus our results further suggest 
that advice from a previous generation of players is a better correlating device, 
facilitating coordination at higher contribution levels, than is direct communication 
among players. Vertical social learning processes appear to be more useful to subjects 
in the public goods game than do similarly structured horizontal learning processes.   29
In her book “The Nurture Assumption” Harris (1999) makes a powerful 
argument that it is peers rather than parents who matter more in the social 
acculturation of new generations. We find virtually the opposite to be true in the 
public goods game.  When considering cooperative behaviour in the presence of a 
conflict between cooperation and self-interest and in the presence of heterogeneous 
types, social learning via peer communication does not always enhance cooperation 
while received wisdom from elders generally does.    30
 






This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Wellesley College has provided the 
funds to conduct this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and 
make appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money. This money will 
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
You are in a market with 4 other people. The experiment will consist of 10 decision rounds. 
You will keep track of your decisions and your earnings using the Record Sheet on page 6. 
Please take a look at the Record Sheet now to see how you will keep your track of your 
earnings.  
 
At the beginning of each round (say Round 1) each participant will have an endowment of 10 
tokens. In that round, each participant will choose how many tokens (ranging from 0 to 10) to 
allocate to a private account (Column 2) and how many tokens (ranging from 0 to 10) to 
allocate to a public account (Column 3). For each round, these two numbers should add to 10, 
the total number of tokens you have for that round. In each round you will also write the 
number of tokens you wish to contribute to the public account on the Decision Form (see 
page 7) and hand it to the experimenter. The experimenter will then add up the total 
contributions to the public account and announce it publicly. The total number of tokens 
invested in the public account will be doubled and divided equally among all 5 participants. 
This is your return from the public account and will be announced publicly. Please write this 
number in Column 4. Your personal earnings for this round will equal the number of tokens 
you invested in your private account (Column 2) plus the number of tokens you get back from 
the public account in Column 4 (the latter may be a fractional amount). The round then comes 
to an end and the next round begins.  
 
Each new round will proceed in the same way. Tokens invested in the private account in any 
round do not carry over to the next round. Every round you start with a fresh endowment of 
10 tokens. At the end of the experiment your total earnings from the 10 decision rounds will 
be added up and converted into cash at the rate of 5 cents per token. Earnings in this 
experiment are denoted in experimental dollars and cents which will be converted into cash 
using the exchange rate of 1 experimental dollar equal to $1.50.  
 
[Prior to the beginning of Round 1 of the actual experiment you will have an opportunity to 
communicate with other members of your groups about the proposed course of action in 
Round 1, should you choose to do so. Such communication will occur using the form on page 
4. Notice that you have two options – either to communicate with your groups members or to 
remain silent. When asked to do so please circle one of the two options – Communicate or 
Remain Silent. If you choose to communicate then you have to choose one of two statements 
– (1) I will contribute __ tokens to the public account in round 1 (and you need to fill in the 
blank with a whole number between 0 and 10 or (2) Everyone should contribute __ tokens to 
the public account in Round 1 (where once again in you need to fill in the blank with a whole 
number between 0 and 10). When done please tear out this sheet and hand it to the 
experimenter. The experiment will then publicly announce whether each individual has 
chosen to communicate or remain silent and if the former then the actual statement that the 
individual has chosen to make.]    31
 
In the common knowledge of advice treatment the previous paragraph was 
replaced by the following paragraph. 
 
[Unless you are in the first group to participate in this experiment, when you start the 
experiment you will receive written advice on how to make your decisions from a group of 
subjects who participated in the experiment prior to you. Each of you will get to see the 
advice left by all the players in this group prior to you. So each of you is looking at the exact 
same set of advice as every body else. Besides providing you with this advice the 
experimenter will also read the advice out loud prior to starting the experiment. At the end of 
your 10 decision rounds you will be asked to leave advice to the next group of players in the 
experiment.  Each of you is paired with another player, who you do not know and who will 
participate in the experiment immediately after you. On top of what you make in this session 
of the experiment, you will receive an additional payment equal to 50% of the earnings of 
this. You will be told how to collect this second payment after the instructions have been 
read. Please write your advice on the sheet (page 6) provided, and write or print legibly. In 
writing advice we encourage you to specify a contribution amount or range to the next player. 
You will be notified by email or telephone when your second payment is ready.] 
 
If you have any questions, please ask them now.    32
 





Before the beginning of the actual experiment, i.e. before Round 1, you will be asked to 
predict how many tokens every participant will choose to contribute to the public account in 
Round 1. When you are asked to do so, please write down your prediction of how many 
people will contribute 0, or1, or 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, or 6, or 7, or 8, or 9 or 10 tokens in the 
space provided on page 4. Please take a look now. When you add your predictions of the 
number of people that will contribute 0, or 1, or 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, or 6, or 7, or 8, or 9 or 10 
tokens they should add to 5. You are predicting for everyone in the group including you. 
 
You will be paid for each of your correct predictions as follows. Your earnings will equal 50 
cents less the sum of squared differences between your predictions and the actual choices. 
 
EXAMPLES:  Suppose that 5 people each had a red ball and a blue ball, and that they were 
all asked to put one and only one of the balls into an urn.  At the same time they each were 
asked to predict the number of red balls and the number of blue balls that would end up in the 
urn.  With a payment rule like that above they would find their earnings as follows: 
 
Predict  Actual  Sq.Diff            Predict  Actual  Sq. Diff 
 
Blue    5          0         25         Blue     5         5        0   
 
Red    0          5         25         Red      0         0        0   
 
            Total      50                          Total        0   
                      
            50 – 50  =  0                          50 - 0 =  50   
 
                   Predict  Actual  Sq. Diff             Predict  Actual  Sq. Diff 
 
Blue    3          3         0         Blue     4       _1_     9   
 
Red    2          2         0         Red      1         4      9   
 
   Total      0                           Total   18   
 
            50 – 0 =   50                          50 – 18 =  32   
 
You will make this prediction once before you get to read the advice and once after you get to 
read the advice.  
 
 
You will be told the actual choices made for the periods you were asked to make predictions 
at the end of the experiment. 
 





Prediction BEFORE the Communication Round  
 
 
Tokens Predict Actual Sq.  Diff
0     
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
TOTAL     
 
Earnings = 50 - __ =    
   34
Subject ID ____________________ 
 














If you chose “Communicate” then please pick one of the two 
statements below (by checking the box on the left) and fill in 









□ 2. Everyone should contribute ____ tokens to the public 
account in round 1. 
 
 
Tear out this page when you are done and hand it to the 
experimenter.   35




Prediction AFTER the Communication Round  
 
 
Tokens Predict Actual Sq.  Diff
0     
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
TOTAL     
 
Earnings = 50 - ____ =          36
Record Sheet 
 












(Add Cols. 2 
and 4) 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
    TOTAL   
 
 
TOTAL EARNINGS:  
 
Earnings from the game:        _______________ 
 
Earnings from first prediction:    _______________ 
 
Earnings from second prediction:   _______________ 
 
TOTAL:          ________________ 
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It would be good to give generously in the first two or three rounds as others do as 
well and so the returns are high. As you go on, maybe keeping at least 5 tokens in the 
private account is also good as it is yours to keep anyway.  




Please contribute more but not too much at private account. 




Do not listen to anyone else’s advice! Here is the maths. Public 10 X 5 players = 50 
(which gets doubled) = 100/5 = 20 each. Private 10 = 10 ea. You must trust each 
other. Always give 10. If you get greedy and only start paying in a little to the public 
then the group (you are in the group!) loses. For everyone to win (and get the highest 
possible amount) give 10 always to the public account. Trust me, trust the other 
players. Always give 10! Be smart – group max = your pay max. Nobody likes a 
greedy person either! If everyone listens to me then you should predict everyone to 
choose 10! Good luck.  




By having more invested return will be more unless your group is very conservative. 
Take the first few rounds to see whether your group is aggressive. If your group is, 
then throw all you have at it. If not then invest 1 or 2. 




The contribution amounts of the others in the group is unexpected, so just contribute 
average money in different rounds.  
Suggested first round contribution: 6 
   39
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Table 1: Design of the Experiment 
 

















































N/A 5  5 25  250 
Treatment 4: 
No advice or 
communication 
N/A 8 
(5 plus the 3 
progenitor 
groups from 
Families 1, 2 and 
3 of Treatment 2) 
5 40  400 
       189 1890 
 
 
                                                 
12 Generation 2 here had four players instead of the usual 5.    42
Table 2: Tobit Model of Contributions in the Communications Treatment 
 




Tobit with Player 
Dummies 
1/t  10.6698*** 7.4903*** 10.7855*** 
 (1.1929)  (0.8301)  (1.2882) 
4.1862*** 3.3399*** 9.5193***  Communication Code = 
1 (CC1)  (1.0456) (1.1217) (2.0218) 
3.0519*** 2.3066** 8.9416***  Communication Code = 
2 (CC2)  (0.9736) (1.0041) (1.8887) 
0.0364 0.0292 -0.0644  Lag Deviation from 
Average Contribution  (0.0803) (0.0583) (0.0885) 
Constant -1.7065*  -0.2044  -6.2437*** 
 (0.9031)  (0.9216)  (1.7418) 
Log Likelihood  -905.03    -872.28 
Wald χ
2 (4)  95.45*** 90.48***   
LR χ
2 (50)     347.41*** 





2.26 1.69 0.18 




   353.61*** 
τ     3.1259*** 
     (0.1397) 
σu  3.3983*** 2.2637   
 (0.3908)     
σe  2.8945*** 2.1521   
 (0.1336)     
ρ  0.5795 0.5253   
Number  of  Observations  450 450 450 
Number  Uncensored  292  292 
Number Lower 
Censored 
108  108 
Number Upper 
Censored 
50  50 
Number of players  50  50   
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
ρ: Fraction of Variance due to ui 
# : F-test for Tobit regression with player fixed effects  43
Table 3: Contributions by Treatment 
 




Tobit with Player 
Fixed Effects 
1/t  10.5962*** 7.0790*** 10.6563*** 
  (0.6416) (0.4318) (0.7182) 
No Advice Treatment  1.1180**  1.0133**  2.1338* 
  (0.5355) (0.4774) (1.1798) 
3.0045*** 2.4413*** 5.8191***  Inter-generational  Advice 
Treatment  (0.4689) (0.4120) (0.9297) 
Constant  Advice  Treatment  4.4628*** 3.6356*** 9.6395*** 
  (0.5998) (0.5512) (1.1922) 
-0.0828* -0.1047***  -0.2725***  Lag Deviation from Average 
Contribution  (0.0440) (0.0312) (0.0491) 
Constant  1.3028*** 2.1361*** 2.7454*** 
  (0.3879) (0.3314) (0.8553) 
Log Likelihood  -3301.41    -3213.20 
Wald χ
2 (5)  345.36*** 338.74***   
LR χ
2 (171)     1535.63 




30.41*** 22.09*** 20.35*** 
Joint Significance of Player 
Dummies (χ
2(167)) 
   1440.69*** 
τ     3.2691*** 
     (0.0772) 
σu  4.1318*** 2.0757   
 (0.2414)     
σe  2.8966*** 2.1374   
 (0.0689)     
ρ  0.6705 0.4853   
Number of Observations  1701  1701  1701 
Number  Uncensored  1056  1056 
Number  Lower  Censored  258  258 
Number Upper Censored  387    387 
Number of players  189  189   
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
ρ: Fraction of Variance due to ui    
# : F-test for Tobit regression with player fixed effects  44
Table 4: Average Pre and Post Communication Beliefs and First Period 
Contributions in the Communication Treatment 
 
 Communication 
Code = 0 
(CC0) 
Communication 
Code = 1 
(CC1) 
Communication 































Beliefs and First 
Period Contribution 
0.7787 0.5764 0.7571 
Standard deviations in parentheses         
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Histogram of First Period Contributions: Simulated Data
 
 